Web3 老尘
Web3 老尘
2017年入圈，经历了各种起起伏伏活到了现在，不认命，但认输
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There are three notable changes in BSC's Jenner upgrade plan:
BEP-702: Introduces an asset standard supporting compliance control.
BEP-703: Reserves 5% block Gas by default for eligible payment transactions.
BEP-706: Allows smart contracts to read millisecond-level timestamps.
Looking at these three together, the direction is clear: besides improving performance, it is also laying the infrastructure for payments, tokenized assets, and more refined financial applications.
The plan is to activate on the mainnet on December 8, and it has not been executed yet.
Uniswap's strength lies in spot liquidity and infrastructure, Hyperliquid has established its own ecosystem in the perpetual contracts field, while Aster attempts to compete for users through spot, perpetual contracts, and multi-chain deployment.
Although these projects all belong to the decentralized trading sector, they are actually competing in somewhat different markets.
Real fee revenue, user retention after incentives are deducted, and where the revenue ultimately flows.
Especially for platforms with high trading incentives, short-term trading volume may look impressive, but the more important question is how much genuine demand remains after the incentives end.
The GOOGLc collateral market of Aave V4 has 189 supply positions, with a collateral scale of about 3.7 million USD.
Interestingly, the top 20 positions account for about 96% of the collateral amount, among which 16 borrow USDC through these collaterals.
Tokenized stocks are moving from "on-chain holding" to "on-chain financing."
However, the current usage is highly concentrated; the next step to watch is the number of independent borrowers, not just TVL.
Tokenization of stocks has encountered an interesting resistance.
OKX and the parent company of the New York Stock Exchange, ICE, plan to launch a 24-hour trading platform for tokenized U.S. stocks.
But as of October 30, 50 listed companies have raised objections, including Nvidia, Microsoft, Google, JPMorgan, Nike, Costco, and Reddit.
Among them, 43 belong to the 62 companies initially proposed to be included on the platform.
Why can listed companies say no?
Because the relevant temporary exemption framework of the U.S. SEC stipulates that a third party wanting to tokenize a company's stock and trade it on a specific venue must notify the issuer in advance. The company can object within the specified period.
Here is an easily overlooked distinction:
A company allowing its securities to enter a regulated on-chain custody and settlement system does not mean it agrees to unrelated third parties issuing and trading corresponding stock tokens on their own.
This also gives another perspective to the recent news about DTCC advancing securities tokenization.
Wall Street is not simply for or against putting stocks on-chain; it is debating who has the right to issue, who controls the trading, and what rights investors actually have.
Currently, these objection announcements do not disclose the specific reasons of each company, so no conclusions can be drawn on their behalf.
Source:
https://t.co/6DO2HekL8f
https://t.co/QgyAKU4Yl8
The tokenization of securities on Wall Street has begun to enter the practical operation stage.
On October 28, DTCC officially launched its securities tokenization service.
Twenty institutions including JPMorgan Chase, Citibank, Morgan Stanley, and Bank of America have signed access agreements, with the first batch involving 34 eligible securities.
These tokens are not simply synthetic assets tracking stock prices.
They correspond to securities actually held in custody by DTC, designed to retain all original ownership, economic rights, and investor protections, and can be converted between traditional securities and on-chain forms.
Moreover, DTCC's token contracts include compliance controls such as suspension, destruction, and recovery.
This is very different from the fully free-floating, non-intervenable on-chain stocks many imagine.
Wall Street is integrating blockchain into the existing securities system, rather than simply replacing the original custody and regulatory structures with blockchain.
What is truly worth watching is whether these tokens can bring actual efficiency improvements in cross-institution collateralization, clearing, and settlement.
Official:
https://t.co/NR5LLlZ0HB
Product mechanism:
https://t.co/fU06w2hbf2
Uniswap recently launched a pretty interesting tool called TJAR.
Originally developed for protocol fee conversion and the UNI burn mechanism, it is now open for use by other applications.
After applications receive various token fees, they can hand them over to TJAR, where third parties compete to complete the conversion, ultimately receiving the tokens they specify.
According to official disclosures, this mechanism handled over $15.3 million in conversions last month and has been deployed on 7 chains.
Even more interestingly, Robinhood is already using it to convert fees collected through the Uniswap API into USDC and USDG.
Uniswap is turning a mechanism originally used internally into infrastructure that other applications can also reuse.
What’s worth watching next is how many applications actually adopt it and whether it will develop an independent business model.
After Binance resumed withdrawals, an interesting data discrepancy appeared.
According to Reuters on November 1, Binance disclosed a net customer outflow of about $3.64 billion.
But DefiLlama at that time showed a fund outflow scale of about $5.81 billion.
The difference between the two sides was about $2.17 billion.
Binance's explanation was that third-party statistics did not correctly account for funds transferred by the exchange to new hot wallets.
The question arises: does seeing funds leave a certain exchange address on-chain necessarily mean users are withdrawing?
Not necessarily.
Exchanges may transfer assets between hot wallets, cold wallets, and new addresses. Incomplete address ownership identification can misinterpret internal transfers as customer withdrawals.
However, Binance's own numbers also need verification.
What really deserves tracking is whether net customer outflows, internal exchange transfers, and changes in asset reserves can be reconciled item by item.
This incident is not only a test of Binance's fund security but also a test of third-party on-chain data platforms' statistical capabilities.
Source:
https://t.co/XB43u7TyNP
https://t.co/andMqmXj3K
Chainlink's release at Link:NYC this time is more noteworthy than just announcing a partnership.
CustodySync allows institutional custody assets to participate in DeFi lending, while Chainlink 24/7 provides around-the-clock pricing for tokenized assets, which Aave has announced it will adopt.
This means RWA is moving from "putting assets on-chain" to "truly enabling assets to participate in financial activities."
Uniswap announced new progress on TJAR on October 29: the fee conversion system is now available for use by other applications.
According to the official statement, assets converted through this mechanism exceeded $15.3 million last month, and Robinhood is also using it.
However, this is easily misunderstood: the amount of fees converted does not equal protocol revenue, and even less so UNI burn.
To study UNI's value capture, one must track where the fees ultimately go and how much actually enters the burn address, rather than just looking at an increasing processing volume.
There is a particularly noteworthy technical detail in Binance's recent security incident.
Binance officially stated that currently there is no evidence of wallet private key leakage.
However, TRM Labs' on-chain investigation found that the attacker used the EIP-7702 authorization mechanism on Ethereum.
Simply put, EIP-7702 allows ordinary wallets to authorize the execution of specific smart contract code.
The attacker exploited this authorization to have a Binance hot wallet execute transfer logic controlled by the attacker.
TRM also discovered that the attacker prepared 50 signature authorizations in advance and carried out fund transfers on nine other chains.
This highlights a very important issue:
The private key itself not being directly extracted does not mean the transaction signing system is necessarily secure.
If an attacker can induce or manipulate the system to generate valid authorizations, serious losses can still occur.
However, it is not yet possible to conclude that EIP-7702 itself has a vulnerability.
It is merely an execution mechanism used in this attack on Ethereum.
The real root cause still awaits Binance's complete technical review.
I believe this incident is worth all wallets and exchanges reconsidering:
Security is not just about safeguarding private keys, but also about limiting what operations the signing system is authorized to perform.
Source: TRM Labs on-chain investigation · EIP-7702 official specification
